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Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to explore the possible relationship between the management 
styles or practices of top management and organizational performance. It examines 
Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on Stock (ROS) of the top two-hundred Canadian 
companies in market capitalization on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) each year in 
the past six years by using the data from Canadian Business magazine and relates these 
performance measures to the practices of the companies’ top management. The finding 
shows that these ‘great’ companies views building the quahfied team as the priority 
strategy, and they all appreciate and compensate for employees’ hard work and 
performance. Finally, according to the analysis and findings, an organization’s top 
management will influence a firm’s long-term performance. 
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Statement of the Problem 
This study is about partially replicating Jim Collins’ (2001) U.S. work in his book 
of Good to Great within a Canadian context He examined American companies that 
were consistently listed in the Fortune 500 for the past 30 years and which consistently 
beat the market average in return on equity (ROE) and return on stock (ROS). His goal 
was to find what made these companies consistently beat the market average and he 
found that it was superior top management which he labeled level 5 leadership. I will 
partially duplicate his study to test whether top management influences organizational 
performance in Canada and whether Colhns’ findings hold in the Canadian context. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to explore the possible relationship between the management 
styles or practices of top management and organizational performance. It examines ROE 
and ROS of the top two-hundred Canadian companies in market capitalization on the 
Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) each year in the past six years by using the data from 
Canadian Business magazine and relates these performance measures to the practices of 
the companies’ top management. As well, this study is trying to determine if a more 
detailed and deeper examination of the ‘problem’ and question(s) is warranted and/or 
feasible: if the result will provide meaningful insights into Canadian organizational 
management comparable to Collins’s (2001). 
Research Question(s) 
1 
Does top management influence long-term organizational performance as measured by 
ROS and ROE in the Canadian context? (And, if so, how do the key characteristics of 
these top managers compare with the CoUins study in the U.S., as evidenced in pubhcly 
available sources?) 
This research question is about exploring the possible relation ship between a 
firm’s management practice and its financial performance, and to find out what kind of 
management style or practice leads a firm to success. It will fill the gap in our knowledge 
that a firm’s management makes the difference in a firm’s performance. It will also find 
out whether Collin’s finding of the level 5 leadership hold in the Canadian context. 
Definitions of Key Terms 
Return on Equity is a measure of a firm’s profitabihty, and shows how much 
money a company makes with the money that shareholders have invested in the 
firm. It is calculated as follows: ROE = net profit / shareholder’s equity 
Return on Stock refers to the gain or loss on the stock price, and shows a 
company’s stock performance in the market. It is calculated as follows: 
ROS = net change in stock price / the original stock price. 
In this study, the stock prices for the listed companies wiU be the value of the stock as of 
the date of publication of Canadian Business Magazine. Thus, the net change in price 
will be the change between stock prices taken annually, rather than an aggregated value 
based on daily, weekly, monthly or quarterly values for the stocks. It is believed that 
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using an annual measure will level out periodic fluctuations and market adjustments and 
provide a more legitimate estimate of the performance of the company over time. Annual 
measure will enable me to easily use the financial data “as the basis for more rigorous 
screening and analysis” (Collins, 2001, p.221). It will also allow me to reduce the 
number of selected companies to a manageable size since yearly data is more publicly 
available. 
Delimitation and Limitations 
Delimitation: This study will confine itself to collecting and examining the stock price 
fluctuation of the top two-hundred Canadian companies (listed on the TSX) in market 
capitalization over the past six years. Lack of complete records is part of the reason for 
this delimitation: Collins collected data for 15-plus years. However, narrowing the scope 
to only the stock performance in the past six years is seen as sufficient for a first, 
preliminary study and to concentrate on the two key variables of the companies’ financial 
performance and relate this to management styles or practices. 
Similar to CoUins, the equity return and stock price fluctuation are used as a first cut to 
select and determine the ‘great’ companies which outperform others in the market and 
exceed market average. 
Limitations are: A) The sampling is selective and consists only of medium and large 
companies. The findings may not be representative for small companies. 
B) The review period consists of only six years because Canadian data is only complete 
for this period. This varies from the fifteen years of the Collins’ study and thus the 
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results may not be strictly comparable. However it is expected that results will be 
sufficient for an exploratory study. Thus, an exploratory study using data openly 
available regarding the top companies listed on the TSX was seen as the appropriate 
place to begin. In addition, the complexities of the Canadian context — for example 
foreign ownership structures and governance structures — are difficult to unravel. 
Depending upon the results of this study, a more in-depth study that accounts for the 
complexities of the Canadian context, for example with regard to governance issues, for 
example, may be undertaken. 
Review of the Literature 
Introduction 
This literature review “includes the scholarly literature that relates” to the 
problem, in this case management, ROE, and ROS and provides “a summary of the 
review that highlights the most important studies, captures major themes in the review, 
and suggests why we need more research on the topic” (Creswell, 2003, p.45). 
Top Management 
Collins (2001) stated that every good-to-great company has a ‘level 5 leadership’. Good- 
to-great companies are those whose “fifteen-year cumulative stock returns at or below the 
general stock market, punctuated by a transition point, then cumulative returns at least 
three times the market over the next fifteen years” (Collins, 2001, p.6). Collins classified 
corporate executives in a five-level hierarchy, and Level 5 leadership “refers to the 
highest level in a hierarchy of executive capabilities” (p.21). Level 1 to level 4 leaders 
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are described as highly capable, contributing, competent, and effective individuals 
respectively, while level 5 leaders include all these four attributes and two others: 
humihty and wiU. A Level 5 leader is a top executive who “builds enduring greatness 
through a paradoxical blend of personal humility and professional will” (Collins, 2001, 
p.20). Every one of the good-to-great companies examined by Collins had a level 5 
leaders in the critical transition phase that the company’s cumulative stock return begins 
to soar and beats the market average by at least three times in the next fifteen years. 
None of the comparison companies did, in his study. Comparison companies are the 
selected direct comparators to great companies, and they have similar capabilities and 
resources. Comparison companies are used to determine the differences in management 
in good and leadership in great companies. These leaders are described as being modest 
with a fierce, unwavering commitment to high standards (Collins, 2001). 
This study will examine the management style of Canadian companies which are 
judged to match Colhns’ s opening criteria for greatness: those which consistently beat the 
market average for ROE and ROS over the time period under study. He defined the 
criteria for selection of good-to-great company: the company ,which has existed for 
fifteen years before the transition point of from good to great in performance, had “a 
cumulative total stock return no better than 1.25 times” of the general stock market 
(Collins, 2001, p.219). After the transition point, the company would have a cumulative 
total stock return of three times greater than the market average in the next fifteen years. 
I am not using all of Colhns’ criteria, and mine is only partially similar to his. Because I 
only have the stock data for the past six-years, I have to use more strict criteria to select 
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the qualified company, which has to beat the general market and industry averages in 
both ROS and ROE every single year. 
Return on Equity 
Leng (2004) recognized the impact of corporate governance practice on firms’ financial 
performance. “Poor governance standards in both private and government-owned firms 
were blamed in part for the East Asian financial crisis” of 1997-98 (p.309). The central 
purpose of Leng’s study was to identify primary factors relating to corporate governance 
that affected return on equity. The sample consisted of 77 Malaysian listed companies 
over the period 1996-99. 
Leng found that the factors which significantly influenced return on equity were “the 
degree of ownership of shares in a company by institutional investor (INST), the gearing 
ratio or the level of debts, and the size of the company” (p.315). These environmental 
factors may have been significant though Collins’ study suggests other even more 
significant factors (e.g., top management characteristics and style) may be at work. 
Return on Stock 
Cooper, Gutierrez, and Marcum (2005) tested the evidence on predictability of stock 
return in real time, in order to confirm or disconfirm this ‘common’ understanding: “In 
the last 30 years, financial economists have documented ample evidence that both the 
time series and the cross section of stock returns are predictable” (p.469). The sample of 
this study was “aU NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ nonfinancial firms listed on the Center 
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for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) monthly stock return files and the Compustat 
annual industrial files from 1963 through 1997” (Cooper, Gutierrez, & Marcum, 2005, 
p.472). Based on the findings, a real time investor could not use standard methods - such 
as book to market equity, firm size, and one year lagged return - to forecast the return of 
stock over the period of 1974 to 1997. Using a recursive out of sample method, which is 
a procedure used to simulate an investor’s real time decision making process, they 
concluded that “the market is difficult to beat” and that “the notion of predictabihty 
currently in the literature is exaggerated” (p.492). 
If the market is difficult to beat, and yet some companies’ ROS consistently beat the 
market average and overall returns, it follows that there must be something which 
influences the firms and their stock performance other than strictly technical ‘fixes’. It 
also means that the book ratio, firm size one-year return and other fundamental factors 
can not dependably be used to forecast the stock return. According to Collins’ (2001) 
study, it is top management who affect the company’s stock performance more than these 
other factors. 
The major hypothesis of this exploratory study, like that of Collins’ is that the firm’s top 
management has influence on the firm’s performance, thus affect its stock performance 
and stock price. It is this phenomenon that is examined in this study. 
Summary 
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Cooper, Gutierrez, and Marcum (2005) studied the evidence of predictability of 
stock return in real time only to find that the concept of predictability of stock return in 
the literature is exaggerated and the market is difficult to beat. If a company’s ROS 
consistently beat the market average and overall return, there must be something which 
influences the firm’s stock performance and this is hkely associated with the firm’s top 
management which, after aU has influence on the firm and its performance, including its 
stock performance. 
According to Collins (2001), there is a level 5 leader in every company that has 
gone from ‘good to great.’ However, his study is based on American firms and 
executives, and it is not clear if his findings hold in the Canadian context. Therefore, this 
research is required to explore the relationship between a firm’s top management and its 
performance in Canada. I will compare and contrast the ‘good’ company and the ‘great’ 
company to see whether there are differences in management style or practice, and 
executive’s characteristic. The result of this finding will be used to analyze whether a 
firm’s management affects its earning and stock performance. In addition, I will compare 
the finding to Collins’ (2001) study to see if there are similar, and report any difference. 
Methods 
Type of Research Design 
The research design for this study is the use of statistics, documents, and secondary 
analysis (Neuman, 2003). This research is non-reactive because subjects being studied 
are unaware of that fact. Secondary analysis will be used in the proposed study since the 
data exists and is public and I am able to “examine the data in new ways to address new 
questions without reactive effects” (Neuman, 2003, p.309). The existing data of ROE 
14 
and ROS from Canadian Business are examined to address the relationship of 
management and performance of these ‘great’ companies, i.e., those which consistently 
beat the market averages for ROE and ROS. 
Sample, Population and Participants 
The population is estimated at 2000 plus Canadian companies listed on the TSX. This 
study uses a single-stage sampling procedure, and the researcher has access to 
information in the population and can sample the company directly from the companies’ 
websites or any stock information website. The largest 200 of these 2000 companies, in 
terms of market capitalization as listed on the TSX are sampled because these large 
companies can be expected to have more influence on the industry and economy and the 
results may be better generalized to the whole population than any other sample of this 
size. 
A six-year term used in the analysis should be long enough to make the preliminary 
observations that are consistent with such an exploratory study and reflect the typical 
business cycle and planning horizon of many firms, namely five to six years. As well, 
most investment-analysis tools only look back as far as the past five-year period. 
The companies not included in the top two-hundred are all small-capitalization 
companies, and these are viewed as having limited influence on the market. The study 
wiU not involve stratification of the population before selecting the sample because the 
selecting process is based on market capitalization only. Finally, there are no participants 
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used in the proposed study, as the data are drawn from secondary, publicly available 
sources. 
Data Collection Instruments, Variables and Materials 
ROE and ROS are financial variables of this study, and they will be used to examine the 
research question. Management style or practice is another variable, although its 
complexity might make it better described as a factor, rather than a variable. The past 
six-year data from Canadian Business magazine’s annual investor report is a major 
source of the data. Other sources will be publicly available annual reports, where these 
will be examined for evidence of top management characteristics. There are no 
‘experimental’ instruments and materials required to collect this data and, therefore, 
confidentiahty of data and findings will not be at issue. 
Data Analysis Procedures 
The data analysis is presented as a series of the following seven steps. 
Step 1. Sample the top two-hundred listed companies in market capitalization at 
TSX, collecting the six-year data of the ROE and ROS of the top two-hundred companies 
from Canadian Business magazine’s annual report and/or the companies’ websites. 
Canadian Business magazine’s annual report is the only source which provides the data 
of ROE and ROS of TSX. It is similar to the magazine of Fortune 500, which was used 
by Collins. 
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Step 2. Eliminate companies with missing ROE and ROS data. Missing data 
often mean the information is not available, and the company with missing data has less 
value for this study. 
Step 3. Calculate the average returns of equity and stock for the market for each 
year. This is the basis for the selection of ‘great’ companies, which have to perform 
better than the market averages in the given time frame. 
Step 4. Select potential candidate ‘great’ companies, i.e., those which beat both 
averages at least five out six years and overall returns. Since there are only one company 
beats both averages every year, I lower the standard in order to get more qualified 
companies. 
Step 5. Check these companies’ websites or search online to see whether or not 
their top executives or management practices have changed, and check through news 
articles, press releases, and companies’ website to determine if their management, 
management style or practice, and organizational structure have changed at any given 
time. If there is a change in the top management, then we can track any change in the 
company’s performance after the transition point. 
Step 6. Compare each ‘great’ company with one direct competitor and one 
indirect competitor to see whether there are differences in management style or practice 
among those companies, and check through my data to find appropriate rivals (similar 
size, capability and industry) from TSX for each ‘great’ company, comparing their 
management style or practice, ROS, and ROE. This step is similar to Colhns’, but he 
only compared the ‘great’ companies with their direct competitors. 
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Step 7. Report the differences and similarities from analysis of the findings, and 
draw conclusions and implications. Finally, I will be able to compare my findings to 
Collins’ to see whether they are similar or not. 
Significance of the Study 
This study will explore whether there is a relationship between management and 
organizational performance. This study will add “to the scholarly research and literature 
in the field” for the following reasons (Creswell, 2003, p.l49). First, the finding of this 
study will support or contradict the research question. Second, it can help to reveal some 
of the underlying logic of the stock market, as well as potentially find what factors 
influence the stock performance. Third, it may revel some of the characteristics of 
the top managers of these ‘great’ companies. 
Analysis 
Introduction 
There are four companies, which meet the selection criteria and are qualified as ‘great’ 
companies. Three out of these four companies are in the oil and gas industry, and the 
other is in the mortgage business. Since the majority of these ‘great’ companies are in 
the oil and gas industry, it is believed their superior performance is hkely to be the result 
of rising oil and gas price in recent years. Higher price possibly contribute to the higher 
ROS and ROE for this industry. One of these three oil and gas companies, Compton 
Petroleum Corporation, will not be used as a demonstration case because its average ROS 
(46.95%) does not beat the industry average (50.43%), and its average ROE (19.95%) 
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does not beat the industry average (15.94%) significantly. The other two (Bonavista: 
28.80% & Peyto: 38.64%) do beat the industry averages which are calculated from the 24 
oil & gas exploration/production companies in the top two-hundred list of TSX of year 
2000 to 2005. 
This study uses a total of nine companies as evidence to demonstrate the possible 
relationship between top management and organizational performance as measured by 
ROS and ROE. 
‘Great’ Companies V.S. Comparison Companies 
‘Great’ company Direct comparator Indirect comparator 
Bonavista Energy Trust 
(G-177, L-21,865) 
Provident Energy Trust 
(G-80,466, L-21,691) 
Paramount energy trust 
(G-145)  
Peyto Energy Trust 
(G-103,043,L-4,337) 
Advantage Energy Income 
Fund (G-86,350, L-6,892) 
BlackRock Ventures Inc 
(L-8309) 
Home Capital Group Inc Equitable Group Inc Home Equity Income Trust 
(The production volumes are based on each company’s first quarter report of 2005.) 
G = nature gas (mcf/d) million cubic feet per day 
L = crud oil and liquid gas (bbls/d) barrel per day 
I classify Provident Energy Trust and Advantage Energy Income Fund as direct 
comparators for the two ‘great’ companies in oil and gas industry by their production 
capacity and focus of production. Although there are differences in the production 
volume, these two direct comparators have the most similar production capacity to these 
‘great’ companies. Paramount Energy Trust and BlackRock Ventures Inc are classified 
as indirect comparators because they only produce a single resource with much less 
production volumes than Bonavista and Peytos’, and they have different focus of 
production as compared to these ‘great’ companies. These two ‘great’ companies 
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produce both resources and their production volumes in particular resources are much 
greater than indirect comparators’. Therefore, they do not compete directly. 
Collins (2001) uses two comparators in his study, which are direct comparisons 
and unsustained comparisons. He compares each good-to-great company to one direct 
comparison in similar capacity and industry, and then compares all unsustained great 
companies to all good-to-great companies. The similarity between my study and coUins’ 
is that we both compare the management practice of the subject to two comparators’, and 
look for both similarity and difference among these companies. 
Equitable Group Inc is the direct comparator to Home Capital Group Inc because 
they are the only two enterprises of the top 500 listed on TSX, which focus on mortgage 
lending business. Home Equity Income is classified as indirect comparator, and it 
focuses on the reverse mortgage business. Reverse mortgage is only available for home 
owner of 60 years old and older who do not have to pay back the loan until they move or 
seU their home. Home Capital and Equitable Group’s target customers are those of first 
time home buyers who cannot get mortgages from big Canadian banks. Both operate in 
niche markets and. therefore, can be viewed as comparable businesses, given a lack of 
direct competition. 
Bonavista and Its Comparators 
Bonavista Energy Trust is one of the three ‘great’ companies, and it has average 
ROS of 188,65% and average ROE of 28.80%. The high average ROS is the result of its 
extremely high ROS in the year of 2000. Taking out the year 2000 performance as an 
outlier, the average ROS in other years is still above the industry average. Bonavista is a 
Calgary-based oil and gas royalty trust, which was created through reorganization of 
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Bonavista Petroleum Limited in July 2003 (Bonavista Energy Trust, 2006). Its base of 
production focuses geographically in Alberta, Saskatchewan, and northeastern British 
Columbia. It is also one of the largest energy trusts in North America with a market 
capitalization of $3.7 billion as of January 1, 2006. It claims to achieve the success in the 
past eight years by foUowing these strategies: 
• Building a qualified and experienced team to apply to strong 
technical and operational expertise; 
• Creating operational strength and dominance in select core 
regions; 
• Developing low cost, low risk, economic opportunities with 
commodity balance; 
• Enforcing capital efficiency and strict cost controls; 
• Maintaining financial flexibility; and 
• Pursuing selective, long reserve life, low decline asset 
acquisitions. 
(Viewpoint, 2006, p.4) 
The board and management are determined to create sustainable and growing business by 
paying a high cash dividend of $3.96 per share (a yield of 12%). The company’s 
management and employees hold 17% of its distribution unit, and this limits their interest 
with their unitholders’. The management and employees will hkely work hard because 
their interests are involved with the firm’s performance. The firm adopts a flat 
organizational structure, and has fewer layers of management between top management 
and field worker than other companies. It appreciates its employee’s hard work and 
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rewards bonus according to their performance. The CEO, Keith A. J. MacPhail who 
joined the company in 1997, leads the firm to success by following the strategies of 
qualified team, low production cost, and low risk of production. The company achieves 
growth goal by reinvesting 40 to 50 percent of its cash flow into its operations, and this is 
considered a very high portion of reinvestment in the industry. 
Provident Energy Trust is the direct comparator of Bonavista Energy Trust. 
Provident has average ROS of 45.17% and average ROE of 5%, and both figures are 
below the industry and Bonavista’s averages. The company was originally founded by 
the CEO, Thomas W. Buchanan, in 1993, and it converted into Provident Energy Trust in 
2001 (Provident Energy Trust, 2006). It is a Calgary-based trust company with 
investments in oil & gas production and energy infrastructure. The company adopted a 
balanced portfoho strategy, which is to invest in diversified, long hfe, and low risk assets 
of its three business units: oil & gas production, production property, and energy 
infrastructure service. The firm achieves sales growth by acquisition or issuing debt and 
equity, not through reinvesting of its cash flow. The firm issues cash distribution to 
unitholders from its cash flow of $1.44 per share (a yield of 10.6%). The company 
claims to manage the business by these value: respect, integrity, creativity, and 
excellence (Provident Energy Trust, 2006). At Provident, top managements treat all 
stakeholders with respect, and provide a supportive and cooperative environment to its 
employees. Title is less important in this firm, and it may value performance more than 
employees. The firm is also flexible enough to adopt into the changing environment, and 
often think outside of the box to increase shareholder value. As well, the firm is striving 
for excellence, and its stated goal is to be the best in the business. 
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Paramount Energy Trust is considered as the indirect comparator to Bona vista. 
Paramount is a natural gas royalty trust company, and it has average ROS of 36.55% and 
average ROE of 11.75%. Both figures are below the industry average (ROS: 50.43%, 
ROE: 15.94%), and this implies that its operation is not as efficient as others in the 
industry. I choose this company as the indirect comparator to Bonavista because they 
have the closest market capitalization to the other two and different focus of production. 
Paramount focuses on natural gas production, and Bonavista focuses on crude oil and 
liquid gas production. Therefore, they do not compete directly in their core businesses. 
According to the president and CEO, Susan Riddell Rose, the goal of the organization is 
to maximize cash distribution and create value to unitholders by following its business 
plan: 
• Asset optimization 
• Maximize cash flow 
• Accretive acquisitions 
• Healthy balance sheet 
(Paramount 2005 Annual Report, 2006, p.3) 
The firm issues cash distribution of $2.88 per share in one year ( a yield of 15.6%). The 
pay out rate is about 79% of its cash flow. It achieves its growth goal by capital 
financing and acquisition. The company achieves its goal of maximizing shareholder 
value by paying out a huge portion of its cash flow. However, its business plan seems 
simple and universal, which is to diversify its investments and focus on low risk, low cost, 
and long life assets, mentioning increasing shareholder value and “your investment 
choice” in energy trust, but not mentioning its management team and employees. The 
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president and CEO, Rose, only said that their people make the difference, but she did not 
say what’s the difference and what’s their contribution to achieve the goal. It seems that 
the company only cares about its unitholders. Unitholders will probably like to hear that, 
but not employees, who may feel that they are not appreciated by top management. 
In summary, the differences among Bonavista and its comparators are building a 
qualified team and achievement of growth goals. Bonavista put building the qualified 
and experienced team as its priority strategy, and the other two choose the assets 
optimization. Bonavista’s strategy is similar to the level 5 leadership, which is “a genius 
with a thousand helpers” and its competitors are more like the level 4 leadership (Collins, 
2001, p-47). Level 5 leaders begin building up the company by setting the strategy 
through people, and then the vision (Collins, 2001). The priority strategy is to get the 
right people in the management team, and then setting up the vision to greatness. 
However, the comparison companies (Provident and Paramount) begin setting the goal of 
asset optimization, and then getting the highly capable people to make it happen. 
Bonavista achieves growth goal by primarily reinvesting large portion of its cash flow 
and the other two by acquisition or issuing debt. By doing this, Bonavista is able to avoid 
future interest cost, and lower the impact of business risk of operating on borrowed funds. 
One thing in common among these firms is that they all focus on low cost, low risk and 
long life assets. I believe this is the nature of this industry since the costs of acquisition 
and exploration of oil and gas fields are high. 
Peyto and Its Comparators 
Peyto Energy Trust is a Calgary-based oil and gas royalty trust company. The firm has 
great performance on both figures as average ROS of 126.51% and average ROE of 
24 
38.64%. The president, CEO, and founder, Don Gray, describes how Pe54o works: “It 
starts with a team who has their interest aligned with our investors,” and they make Pe3do 
unique among others (Peyto Energy Trust, 2006). Employees at Peyto are compensated 
for their performance on market and reserve value growth. Gray is a very confident 
business man who says, “I am able to look at things with typically 100 per cent return” 
(McEiheran, 2004, p.B.2). 
I always wanted to show that you could do it a different way, to prove that you 
didn’t have to cater to the analysts, that you could focus solely on what made 
good strong business sense, and that shareholders were smart enough to flush 
out the guys that were BS- ing them versus the guys who were running truly, 
honestly, a good sohd business. 
(McEiheran, 2004, p.B.2) 
The above quote indicates McEiheran is determined to run the business and confident on 
his ability to make it work his way. Unlike other energy trusts who distribute most of 
their cash flow to unitholders, Peyto reinvests a large portion of its cash flow into 
operation to ensure the growth. Gray is unafraid to challenge the industry norm by 
insisting on maintaining a pay out rate of 50% instead of the industry average of 85 to 
90%. The firm distributes an annual dividend of $1.68 (a yield of 7.2%), which is 
considered a low yield of cash distribution among energy trusts (usually around 10%). 
Under his way of management, the firm has grown rapidly in the past few years. He 
believes that if you set up things right, then you can do it right, and you do not have to 
look for acquisitions regularly (Verburg, 2004). Although he is open for ideas, he always 
does what he thinks is right. His personality is contrary to the characteristic of level 5 
leaders who have a blend of personal humility and professional well. Gray has 
professional will, but he does not have personal humility, though he is determined to 
create superb results, and set “the standard of building an enduring great company” 
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(Collins, 2006, p.36). He believes that he can make the company prosper under his way 
of management without other people’s opinions, and he sounds like that he should take 
the credit for prospering the firm because he is the one who leads the firm to success. 
According to Collins (2001), level 5 leaders attribute the success of the firm to luck or 
other peoples’ hardworking, and they do not claim for the credit. The board, director, 
and top management own about 24% of its outstanding units, and this creates aligned 
interest of its management team with its unitholders. 
Advantage Energy Income Fund is a Calgary-based oil and gas royalty trust 
company. This trust issues monthly cash distribution, and the total pay out is $1.7 per 
unit in 2006 (a yield of 9.38%). The firm has average ROS of 40.93% and average ROE 
of 11.90%. Although these two figures seem reasonable, they are somewhat below the 
industry averages. The company was renamed to Advantage from Search Energy in 
April 2001, and the president and CEO, Kelly I Drader, joined the company in May 2001 
(2005 Corporate Review: Advantage Income Fund, 2006). Prior joining the firm, she had 
over 27 years of experience in this industry. The organizational contributes its success to 
the following factors: 
• Low cost acquisitions of quality, long-life properties 
• Successful, low risk, development drilling 
• Nature gas focus 
• Highly experienced and dedicated technical staff 
(Advantage Energy Income Fund, 2005) 
Its success factors seem quite common in the industry, and almost every oil and gas 
company’s strategy is to acquire low cost, low risk, and long life assets. Since the costs 
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of acquisition and drilling are high in this industry, these oil and gas firms need to adopt a 
strategy in order to keep costs down and ensure growth. Drader mentions that the 
management team is committed to create unitholders value and they own about four 
percent of the outstanding units. This sounds contrary. If the management team is 
dedicated to create value or believes in the prosperity of the firm, then they would also 
invest in the company themselves. For example, the ‘great’ companies of Bonavista and 
Peyto’s management and directors own approximately 17 and 24 percent of their 
outstanding units. I view this as they are committed to the company’s performance 
because their interests are also tied in with unitholders. 
BlackRock Venture Inc is a Calgary-based company that focuses “on the 
exploration, development and production of heavy oil in western Canada” 
(BLACKROCK, 2004). The president of this firm is John Festival, and he was promoted 
to the current position from the position of vice president in January 2001 
(Anonymous, 2000). The company did not mention the reason for this change. I highly 
suspect the reason for the change is the poor performance of previous president, Bruce 
Burton. The earning per share at year 2000 under Burton’s management is only $0.02, 
and it grew to $0.21 in year 2005, and earnings growth of more than ten times over five 
year. Prior to the year 2000, the earning is either few cents per share or negative. 
However, one could argue that the current ‘high’ earning per share is due to the rising oil 
price, and it has not much to do with management. Although the oil price has risen in 
current few years, the oil price is not ten times higher than few years ago. Therefore, I 
believe there must be something to do with Festival’s management for the change in the 
company’s performance. He was later replaced in June 21st, 2006 due to the acquisition 
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by Shell. The firm has a strong average ROS of 53.02% and a weak average ROE of 
3.91%. I beheve the low ROE may be due to less than stellar management because sales 
are growing every year, and the management team was not able to bring down cost. It is 
still not clear why these two figures are so contrary. The possible reasons for outstanding 
stock performance are the rapidly increase in production volume and oil reserve in the 
past few years, and these may catch investors’ attention. The top management was also 
not able to keep their promises. For example. Festival has promised at the year 2002 
annual shareholder meeting not to issue more equity to raise the capital; however, the 
firm kept issuing new shares from 2002 to 2005 (BLACKROCK, 2004). Festival said in 
2005 that the management team insists on the debt free strategy in order to achieve the 
organizational goals, which are to maintain good financial control and strong balance 
sheet, but the firm just financed a debt of $100 million in 2005. I see this result as poor 
management because the management team has to break its promise to keep the company 
going, which is to borrow money. These two events (issuing new share and getting loan) 
are all associated with money. 
In sununary, the difference among Peyto and its comparators is the management 
team. Gray identifies the management team is what makes the firm unique and 
successful, and he mentions it starts with the team. He seems to be a level 5 leader in 
setting up the team, which is “first who and then what” (Collins, 2001). He begins by 
getting the right people in his management team, and then finds the path to greatness. 
The comparison companies do not include or mention the management team as the 
organization’s success factors or strategies. They only mention in their armual report that 
they appreciate their management and employee’s hard work and contribution to the firm. 
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It sounds to me that they are saying so to make them feel better. The similarity among 
three firms is the low risk, low cost, and long life properties strategies, and every 
acquisition or drilling has to meet this strategy in order to ensure growth. Failure in these 
activities will bring the firm into serious financial trouble due to the high development 
cost. 
Home Capital and Its Comparators 
“Home Capital Group Inc is a holding company and operates through its principal 
subsidiary. Home Trust Company” (Home Capital Group Inc, 2006). The firm focuses 
on the mortgage lending business, and experienced rapid growth in both stock and 
earning since inception in 1987. The firm has average ROS of 77.64% and average ROE 
of 25.25%. These two figures are much higher than the general market performance 
(ROS: 26.91%, ROE: 11.10%). It shows the company is doing well under the current 
management. Gerald M. Soloway has been president and CEO since 1987. The firm 
offers stock option to employees as the compensation for their performance. The target 
customer of Home Capital Group Inc is usually the first time home buyers who cannot 
get a mortgage from big banks. The firm’s strategy is to work in partnership with banks. 
The banks get referral commission if they refer rejected customers to Home Capital, and 
banks are happy doing so because they want to keep goodwill with the customer for 
future business. The firm also offers high interest rate deposit service to finance the 
required capital for mortgage lending. Soloway commented on the success of the firm 
that “we work very hard on sticking to what we do know how to do. ...you have to do it 
slowly and patiently” (Critchley, 2005, p.FP.2). He is proud of the service level of the 
firm, and he believes we can serve the public better than big Canadian banks. He 
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believes that customer service is one of the success factors in the financial service 
business. He does not like to take risk, and he only does what he knows. He said that the 
firm has never made an acquisition, and acquisition involved great risk. He believed his 
management team could do better by themselves instead of through acquisition. He said 
that hiring good people has been critical to the firm’s success. He adopts an open door 
policy in his office, and everyone can come to talk to him anytime. There is not a lot of 
formality in Home Capital, and everyone is treated the same regardless position. 
Equitable Group Inc is the direct comparator of Home Capital, and they are the 
only two firms in the Investor 500 which focus on mortgage lending business. Equitable 
is very similar to Home Capital. Both companies focus on sub-prime residential 
mortgage lending and offer deposit service. Their head offices are both in Toronto. 
Although the nature of business is very similar. Equitable does not perform as weU as 
Home Capital. Equitable has average ROS of 9.9% and average ROE of 15.54%. 
Although the average ROE is higher than the market average, its average ROS is much 
lower than the market average. It is unknown why as its ROE has increased steadily in 
the past few years. The long term goal of the firm is to maintain high quality growth, 
profitability, and sustainability (2005 Annual Report, 2006). Its goal sounds like telling 
me that they only care about making money. Should they say something hke being the 
number one in the business? The firms will perform the following activities in 2006 in 
order to achieve its goals. 
First, we intend to use a prudent mixture of Tier 1 (Equitable Trust’s 
shareholders’ equity) and Tier 2 (Equitable Trust’s subordinated debt) regulatory 
capital to improve Return on Equity (ROE). 
Second, we will capitalize on opportunities in each of our four core lending 
segments. 
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Third, we will continue to focus efforts in our primary geographic market and on 
building momentum in the Calgary alternative single family dwelhng niche. 
Fourth, we will introduce our new cashable GIC to a broader number of deposit 
agents. 
(Equitable 2005 Annual Report, 2006, p.5) 
Its planned activities seem fine and reasonable. I think the major difference between 
Equitable and Home Capital is the management team. I do not see any information about 
its management or how they value employees. In their company’s reports, they are 
saying what they will do and what are their strategies, nothing about the management. 
Home Equity Income Trust (HOMEQ) is an unincorporated open-end investment 
trust created under the laws of Ontario to invest in reverse mortgages. HOMEQ 
was created in 2002 as a long-term funding vehicle for the reverse mortgage 
business developed by Canadian Home Income Plan Corporation (CHIP), which 
has been the main underwriter of reverse mortgages in Canada since pioneering 
the concept in 1986. 
(Home Equity Income Trust, 2006, Trust Overview) 
The reverse mortgage is for senior homeowners who are 60 years of age or older, and are 
able to borrow up to 33% of the value of their home without making repayment as long 
as they live in their house. The firm has average ROS of 13.3% and average ROE of 
3.81%. Both figures are lower than the market’s averages, and I suspect the firm has 
issued too many shares. Its recent net earnings are about 12% of its revenues, and this is 
not considered low in the market. The firm’s objective is to provide unitholders with 
sustainable cash distribution of more than 90% of its cash flow while preserving capital. 
The firm’s growth strategy is to wait for the aging Canadian population, and the number 
of seniors wiU automatically grow over time. According to Home Equity, there is only 
one firm doing the reverse mortgage in Canada, and it would mean no competition for the 
firm. As well, the firm has experienced 10% annual compound rate increase in the 
reverse mortgage business in the past five years. Steven K. Ranson was appointed as the 
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president and CEO in August 8, 2002, and the firm’s earning per share has grown from 
$0.29 in 2002 to $0.39 in 2005. He is trying hard to explain the benefit of the reverse 
mortgage to seniors, and the CHIP advertising can still be seen on TV. In the company’s 
report, he mentions that the reverse mortgage is managed by the professional team, and 
he identifies their contribution to the firm’s success. 
In summary, the differences among Home Capital and its comparators are the 
management and the management style. Soloway is the president and CEO of Home 
Capital, and he is also the co-founder of the company. Other two companies’ president 
and CEO are appointed few years ago. Soloway has been the president for almost 20 
years, and he should have a better sense for the business and know what he should do. 
Another difference is the management style. Soloway adopts the open door policy, and 
anyone can talk to him anytime. Employees are valued the same in his company 
regardless their position. The similarity is the service level. They are all dedicated to 
provide good service to their clients, which is better service than big Canadian banks do. 
These firms believe that service level is the success factors for this business because they 
have to compete with banks and local credit unions. 
Findings 
There are four things in common among these three ‘great’ companies: right people, 
compensation, acquisition, and ownership. Bonavista identifies that building qualified 
team is the priority strategy of the firm. The president and CEO of Peyto Energy 
comment on the firm’s success that it starts with management team. Home Capital’s 
president and CEO say that hiring the right people has been crucial to the firm’s success. 
They all begin with finding the right people for their management team, and then work 
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toward the vision. The comparison companies do not do so, and they only mention that 
their employees are important to them without exphcitly stating what this means. This 
finding is similar to the ‘level 5’ leadership, which are first who and then what. However, 
there is not enough information and evidence about these CEOs and their management 
styles, so it is still not clear whether they are level 5 leaders. Another similarity is the 
compensation. They aU appreciate employees’ contribution and reward bonus according 
to their performance. However, not all comparison companies reward employees with 
bonus. The third thing in common among these ‘great’ companies is that they do not like 
to achieve growth goal by acquisition; however, the comparison company like to do so 
and look for acquisition constantly as part of their strategies. The president of Bonavista 
does not like the idea of acquisition, and he prefers to grow the company by reinvest 
large portion of its cash flow. The president of Peyto says that if you are setting the 
things right, you will do it right. As well, you do not need to look for acquisition 
constantly. The president of Home Capital dislikes acquisition, and he think there are too 
much risk and cost involved with that. He beheves he can make the company grow 
without acquisition. However, most of the comparison companies do so to grow their 
companies. The last thing in common among these ‘great’ companies is the high 
ownership of the management team. The management team of Bonavista, Peyto, and 
Home Capital own 17, 24, and more than 20 percent of their companies’ shares. All 
these companies distribute cash dividend either monthly or quarterly. The higher 
ownership ties the interests of the management team with those of the shareholders, and it 
shows they beheve in the future of their companies. The management teams of the 
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comparisons have lower ownership of the firm’s shares, and they own less than 15 
percent of the outstanding shares. (2005 Annual Reports, 2006). 
Conclusion 
According to my analysis and finding, the management has influences on an 
organization’s long-term financial performance as measured by ROS and ROE. The 
firm’s performance will be changed after the top management being replaced. These 
‘great’ companies achieve rapid growth in both ROS and ROE under the management of 
the current president and CEO. All these ‘great’ and comparison companies have similar 
business strategy and resources, and the only difference is the management. Moreover, 
all these ‘great’ companies have four things in common, and none of the comparison has 
all of them. There is not enough information available to indicate that the presidents and 
CEOs of these ‘great’ companies are ‘level 5’ leaders, but they possess the characteristic 
of first who and then what. Due to the time constraint of this project, it may not reveal 
the detailed relationship between an organization’s management and its long-term 
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Appendix A 
Raw list of the qualified companies 
The top 200 companies average (2005-2000) 
Average ROS: 26.91%, ROE: 11.10% 
Bonavista Energy Trust: ROS: 188.65%. ROE: 28.80% (high average ROS due to 
extremely high ROS performance in 2000.) 
Peyto Energy Trust: ROS: 126.51%, ROE: 38.64% 
Compton Petroleum Ltd.: ROS: 46.95%, ROE: 19.95% (This ‘great’ company is not 
used to make the comparison because its average ROS does not beat the industry average, 
and its average ROE does not beat the industry average significantly like the other two). 
Home Capital Group Inc (mortgage lending business) 
Average ROS: 77.64%, ROE: 25.25% 
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Appendix B 
Selected companies and two set of comparator companies 
Direct comparator Indirect comparator 
Bonavista Energy Trust 
(1700) (G-177, L-21,865) 
Provident Energy Trust 
(1823) (G-80,466, L-21,691) 
Paramount energy trust 
(1091) (G-145) 
Peyto Energy Trust (2231) 
(G-103,043, L-4,337) 
Advantage Energy Income 
Fund (566) (G-86,350, L- 
6,892)  
BlackRock Ventures Inc 
(923)(L-8309) 
Home Capital Group Inc 
(1098) 
Equitable Group Inc (244) Home Equity Income Trust 
(167) 
(AU data above are based on each company’s first quarter report of 2005.) 
G = nature gas (mcf/d) million cubic feet per day 
L = crud oil and liquid gas (bbls/d) barrel per day 
The top 200 companies average (2005-2000) 
Average ROS: 26.91%, ROE: 11.10% 
Home Capital Grroup Inc (mortgage lending business) 
Average ROS: 77.64%, ROE: 25.25% 
(No industry averages for Home Capital because there are only 3 companies in the top 
500, which focus on mortgage business) 
Equitable Group Inc (mortgage lending business) 
Average ROS: 9.9% ROE: 15.54% 
Home Equity Income Trust (Reverse mortgage lending for 60 & over) 
Average ROS: 13.3% ROE: 3.81% 
Oil and Gas exploration/production industry (2005-2000) 
Average ROS: 50.43%, ROE: 15.94% 
Bonavista: ROS: 188.65%. ROE: 28.80% (high average ROS due to extremely high ROS 
performance in 2000.) 
Compton: ROS: 46.95%, ROE: 19.95% (This ‘great’ company is not used to make the 
comparison because its average ROS does not beat the industry average, and its average 
ROE does not beat the industry average significantly like the other two). 
Peyto: ROS: 126.51%, ROE: 38.64% 
Provident Energy Trust 
ROS: 45.17%, ROE: 5% 
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Paramount Energy Trust 
ROS: 36.55% ROE: 11.75% 
Advantage Energy Income 
ROS: 40.93% ROE: 11.90% 
BlackRocks Venture Inc 

















The above chart shows TSX ROS and ROE averages of the top 200 companies in market 
capitalization from year 2000 to 2005. The relationship between ROS and ROE is not 
clear. 
TSX oil & gas industry average 
2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 
It shows that oil & gas companies’ ROS and ROE are positively correlated except the 
year of 2003. The TSX has a growth rate of more than 20% every single year in the past 
six years, but the stock market dropped more than 10 % in 2003. 
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Appendix D 
Selected companies and comparator companies 










2005 2004 2001 2000 
-^ROS 
■ ROE 
Bonavista’s year 2000 ROS is not used to make the above chart because of its extremely 
high value (983). This will make the chart more apparent. 
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Home Capital Group Inc 
2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 
year 
Equitable Group Inc 





Home Equity Income Trust 





Paramount Energy Trust 



















In the above chart, Bonavista’s performance is below the industry average and its 
comparator, but it still beats the general market average. Bonavista’s year 2000 
performance is not used to make this chart because of its extremely high value (983%). 
Bonavista's ROE with comparators 
-♦— Bonavista 




Although Bonavista’s ROS performance is lower than comparators and industry average, 
but it maintains an above average ROE over the past six years. The reason for lower 
ROS performance is possibly the result of the already high price, so the growth rate is not 
very apparent. 
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Home Capital's ROE with comparators 
2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 
—♦— Home C. 
—■— Equitable 
Home E. 
H Market 
year 
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